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Organizing and managing channels of distribution is an important marketing task. Due to the emergence of electronic commerce
on the Internet, e-channel distribution systems have been adopted by many manufacturers. However, academic and anecdotal
evidence both point to the pressures arising from this new e-channelmanufacturing environment.Questionmarks therefore remain
on how the addition of this e-channel affects the traditional marketing strategies of leasing and selling. We set up several two-
period dual-channel models in which a manufacturer sells a durable product through both a manufacturer-owned e-channel and
an independent reseller (leaser) who adopts selling (leasing) to consumers. Our main results indicate that, direct selling cost aside,
product durability plays an important role in shaping the strategies of all members. With either marketing strategy, the additional
expansion of an e-channel territory may secure Pareto gains, in which all members benefit.
1. Introduction
Exclusive channel territories are one of the oldest fields of
marketing distribution scholarly activity (e.g., [1, 2]). For
years, organizing and managing distribution channels has
been an integral part of contractual work of the manufac-
turer’s marketing strategy [3–5]. Exclusive territories would
normally form part of the vertical restraint of members of
the distribution channel, by which one member undertakes
not to market his products in a geographical area [1, 4, 6,
7]. However, traditional distribution channels and related
strategies have been impacted by the emergence, disruption,
and transformational effects of the Internet and the creation
of virtual marketplace opportunities. With the realignment
of, or new investment in, associated technologies, the capacity
of manufacturers to search for business and active sales
outside that same market through e-channels has become
an important way to minimize their costs, reach different
customer segments, and remain competitive [8]. As a conse-
quence, many manufacturing firms, including Apple [9], HP
[10], and Lenovo [11], have begun to distribute their products
and reach their customers simultaneously through new e-
channels, which are both integrated and independent (e.g.,
[4]). As such, e-channels have reset many of the exclusive
clause contracts and relational business norms associated
with traditional distribution channel strategies. With the
Internet and e-channels, channel management is no longer
bound or restricted to the traditional market geographies and
distribution channels for leasing and selling.
The addition of manufacturer-owned e-channels to tra-
ditional channels of selling and leasing channel practice
has, however, not been without its pressures, tensions, and
conflict [12]. Academic and anecdotal evidence both point
to the stresses arising from new e-channel environment
where new and direct manufacturing channels have chal-
lenged exclusive channel territories, stability, and resources,
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thereby threatening traditional channels and even whole
business models [13]. Webb and Lambe’s [12] study shows
the potential conflict internal to the supplier firm among
the groups and individuals responsible for managing the
various channels. Anecdotal evidence suggests that channel
members are negatively affected, for example, reports of HP’s
resellers clashing with HP over direct sales encroachment.
One channel member, Repton, explained that “we are now
nervous about engaging with certain HP people; they have
taken business direct even though the deal was registered and
approached some of our longest standing customers” [14].
Despite the growing evidence of manufacturer multi-
channel encroachment and the associated challenges and
pressures, multiple channel systems have remained rela-
tively under researched [15]. Recently several studies have
been undertaken to understand different aspects of multiple
channel systems and this initial research has called for
more research on modelling the channel designs/mixes (e.g.,
[12, 13]). Unlike previous research on durable goods which
focuses on the marketing strategies of leasing and selling in
a single-channel, however, we set up dual-channel models
to understand how the addition of a manufacturer-owned
e-channel impacts on the traditional marketing strategies of
selling and leasing.Theoverall aimof this paper is therefore to
examine the effects of manufacturer-owned e-channel choice
on the traditional marketing channel strategies of selling and
leasing, specifically accounting for the conditions—product
durability, channel structure, and direct selling cost—under
which firms choose a specific type of channel system. In
particular, we intend to answer the following questions: How
does the addition of an e-channel affect manufacturer’s and
reseller’s (leasor’s) performance? What is the implication of
product durability and the channel structure on channel
members’ performance?
As such, our paper makes a number of contributions.
The first is that this study makes an important contribution
to the literature on dual-channel supply chains [16, 17]. We
build on the dual-channel supply chains literature, extend-
ing the analysis of horizontal competition under different
channel structures, empirically linking the different channel
boundary conditions of product durability, channel structure,
and direct selling cost [17]. Specifically, our model extends
and generalizes Arya et al.’s [16] model to the durable goods
setting [18–21]. Furthermore, we build on Heide’s [22] study
and related research [23] in modelling the impact of channel
design/mix on performance. As Heide [22, p.27] notes, “the
specific performance implications of plural systems remain
unanswered. Establishing a link between particular gover-
nance approaches and outcome variables seems an important
research priority.” Our model indicates that, direct selling
cost aside, product durability plays an important role in
shaping the optimal strategies of all members. Second, we
build on the early empirical evidence on vertical restraints
which offers several efficiency-based explanations on the
existence of exclusive territory agreements [7]. Significantly,
our results show that the addition of an e-channel may secure
Pareto gains, in which all members benefit from adding an
e-channel, thus suggesting that a rising e-channel tide lifts
all boats. Here we specify the nature of the efficiency gains,
empirically linking them to different variables of interest.
Third, we find that, to reduce the competition from her
(throughout this paper, we use the feminine pronoun to
refer to the manufacturer and the masculine pronoun to
refer to the dealer (including the reseller and the leaser))
intermediaries, the manufacturer may set a higher wholesale
price (a price skimming strategy) to the reseller (leaser)
in Period 1 (Period 2) under a dual-channel supply chain.
Although pricing is a major concern in channel strategies,
it has received relatively little research attention. This study
shows how price can be deployed as a heuristic device
[24] as part of the manufacturers’ marketing strategy in
order to enjoy the benefits of adding an e-channel. Finally,
we show that, bearing the brunt of the e-channel, leasing
may dominate selling. We show how the addition of e-
channel brings Pareto gains, therefore adding to the literature
which pays little attention to how this issue is affected
by different marketing strategies (i.e., selling and leasing).
This complements existing results that show that, unlike the
optimum behavior of leasing by a durable goods monopolist,
selling turns out to be the unique dominant strategy of the
competing firms. Taken together, this lays the foundation for
more specific research and analyses.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 reviews the related literature and explains our
contributions in more detail. Section 3 describes the key ele-
ments of our basic model and introduces notation. Section 4
outlines single-channelmodels and dual-channelmodels and
reports our main findings. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Relevant Literature
Beginningwith an analysis of time inconsistency (time incon-
sistency refers to a situation in which rational consumers,
anticipating that the monopolist has an incentive to increase
product availability and lower its price over time, postpone
purchases until the price falls to a competitive level.This issue
is formalized in Stokey [25]) by Coase [26], the relationship
between leasing and selling has long been studied for durable
goods. For example, Bulow [27], considering a monopolist
who sells a perfectly durable good in a two-period market,
shows that the monopolist can avoid the time inconsistency
problem and has higher profitability by leasing. Desai and
Purohit [28] explore the strategy of leasing and selling in a
two-period model, finding that the relative profitability of
leasing and selling hinges on the rates at which leased and
sold units depreciate. Poddar [29] considers a simultaneous
move game between two symmetric durable good firms
and finds that selling turns out to be the unique dominant
strategy of the firms. Bhaskaran and Gilbert [30] examine
the possibility that if the manufacturer sells product, then
the dealers can either sell or lease it to consumers and show
that when the level of competition among dealers is high, the
manufacturer prefers to lease rather than sell product to the
dealers. Agrawal et al. [21] adopt a life-cycle environmental
impact perspective and investigate whether leasing can both
be more profitable and have a lower total environmental
impact; they find that leasing can be environmentally worse
(despite remarketing all off-lease products) and greener than
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selling (despite the mid-life removal of off-lease products)
(for a thorough review of the literature on durable goods, see
Waldman [31]). Andrikopoulos and Markellos [32] develop
a model of dynamic interactions between price variations
in leasing and selling markets for automobiles. Empirical
analysis shows that variations in selling (cash) market prices
lead to rapidly dissipating changes of leasing market prices
in the opposite direction. Bhaskaran and Gilbert [33] explore
the interactions between channel structure (direct interaction
with consumers versus through intermediary(ies)) andmode
of operations (leasing versus selling) and their implications
for a manufacturer’s willingness to invest in making her
product more durable.
Although numerous researchers have focused on the
marketing strategies of leasing and selling, most, if not
all, studies traditionally assume that all goods are only
distributed by dealers (i.e., resellers/leasers). However, with
the investment in new technology, themanufacturers increas-
ingly have the capacity of searching for business and active
sales through manufacturer-owned e-channel [8]. Literature
on vertical restraints offers several efficiency-based argu-
ments for the existence of exclusive territory agreements,
that is, not to search for business and active sales through
manufacturer-owned e-channels. Most of these arguments
relate to the incentives for the participants in the relationship
and improved role performance and increase the manufac-
turer’s commitment to the relationship [7, 12, 13, 34].
Related to these arguments is the literature on dual-
channel supply chains, which advances two arguments. The
first argues that the manufacturer direct selling results in
channel conflict, harming relationships and hurting channel
members’ performance. Balasubramanian [35], for example,
analyzes the potential for retail stores to bear the brunt
of direct entry and uses market coverage as leverage to
control conflict between direct marketer and retailer. Lee et
al. [36] propose several practical guidelines for controlling
the conflict in a dual-channel supply chain. Cattani et al.
[37] liken a reseller facing manufacturer direct selling to the
parable of boiling a frog: if the costs and average convenience
of the manufacturer’s e-channel become more favorable over
time, then the manufacturer will be in a position to use the
e-channel to undercut the prices in the traditional channel
and so “boil” the reseller. Dan et al. [38] then show that retail
services strongly influence themanufacturer and the retailer’s
pricing strategies. Betzabe´ and Aydın [39] characterize sce-
narios in which the manufacturer’s and retailer’s assortment
preferences are in conflict.The result shows themanufacturer
may prefer the retailer to carry items with high demand
variability, while the retailer prefers items with low demand
variability. Panda et al. [40] found that there is a severe
price competition between the retail and online channel,
and product compatibility has a significant impact on the
pricing policy. The marketing literature has also analyzed
some antecedents and consequences of vertical constraints,
with antecedents ranging from the manufacturer’s strategic
brand positioning on quality (i.e., [41]), positive relationship
between coordination and support efforts [3], the manufac-
turer’s position in the distribution channel in relation to the
competition existing in the manufacturers’ market [42], and
the provided distributor services that could be free-ridable by
other channel members [3].
The second research stream, including Chiang et al. [43],
Arya et al. [16], Dumrongsiri et al. [44], Cai [45], and Dan
et al. [38], states that manufacturer encroachment brings
Pareto gains and all channel members benefit from the
encroachment. This efficiency-led approach proposes that e-
channel encroachment improves the role performance of all
of the members companies and thereby the efficiency of the
channel as a whole. In the marketing literature, studies find
that exclusive territories agreements aim to create incentives
system for parties in the channel relationship [3, 7], while
a more anticompetitive led argument approach claims that
exclusivity is used as a device to reduce competition and to
extract monopoly rents from the market [46, 47].
While this research starts to inform, in part, our under-
standing of the questions, (i) how does the addition of
an e-channel affect manufacturer’s and reseller’s (leasor’s)
performance? and (ii) what is the implication of product
durability and the channel structure on channel members’
performance?, we also need to build on this work in a number
of important respects. First, model RE in this paper reduces
to Arya et al. [16] when product durability goes to zero;
thus it nests Arya et al. as a special case and generalizes
it to the durable goods setting. Second, Xiong et al. [17]
assume that the product is perfectly durable and does not
deteriorate over time, and thus they cannot account for
how product durability affects the interactions between a
manufacturer and her dealers (including the reseller and
the leaser). In contrast, we allow product deterioration over
time and try to account for the strategic effects of product
durability, channel structure, and direct selling cost, which
can capture several characteristics salient in many of today’s
durable goods markets. Third, Xiong et al.’s [17] focus on an
environment of the dealer adopts a mix of selling and leasing.
In contrast to Xiong et al.’s [17], we instead investigate a much
more common marketing setting, where selling and leasing
are adopted by resellers and leasers, respectively and focus on
how the addition of an e-channel affects different marketing
strategies of selling and leasing.
3. Model Development
As in Arya et al. [16] and Xiong et al. [17], the sequence of
the game between the manufacturer and the reseller is as
follows: the manufacturer announces the wholesale price to
the reseller (leaser) who then responds by determining the
optimal units for selling (leasing). The manufacturer then
chooses the units to be sold through the e-channel.
3.1. Product. To capture the durable nature of a product,
we use a two-period model (a two-period model not only
allows us to study dynamic issues while retaining tractability
but also simplifies the presentation of our analysis (similar
assumption is adopted by Desai and Purohit [19, 28] and
Bhaskaran and Gilbert [30])) in which only new products are
available in Period 1, but both new and used products (i.e.,
those “new” units marketed in Period 1 and then classified as
“used” in Period 2) are available in Period 2. As in Desai and
4 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
Purohit [19, 28], we designate the durability of the products
produced in Period 1 using factor 𝛾 (0 ≤ 𝛾 ≤ 1). If 𝛾 = 1,
the product is perfectly durable, meaning that, in Period 2,
used units are identical to new units. If 𝛾 = 0, the product
is nondurable and deteriorates fully after one period of
use.
3.2. Manufacturer Strategies. The manufacturer’s problem is
to maximize her profits by setting wholesale prices (𝑤
𝑖
) and
choosing units (𝑞
𝑖𝑚
) to sell through the e-channel. Here, 𝑖 =
1, 2 denotes Period 1 or 2. As in Arya et al. [16] and Xiong
et al. [17], for simplicity, we normalize her marginal cost of
production to zero and assume that her marginal cost of
selling on the e-channel is 𝐶
𝑒
= 𝑐 ≥ 0.
3.3. Reseller (Leaser) Strategies. The reseller (leaser) maxi-
mizes his profit by choosing 𝑞
𝑖𝑟
(𝑞
𝑖𝑙
). To ensure that the reseller
(leaser) has an advantage in the distribution channel, like
Arya et al. [16] and Xiong et al. [17], we assume that the
reseller’s (leaser’s) unit marketing cost is 𝐶
𝑟
= 0 (𝐶
𝑙
= 0).
3.4. Consumers. We derive the inverse demand functions
from the consumer utility functions. We refer the reader to
Desai and Purohit [28] and Agrawal et al. [21] for the detailed
derivation. Let 𝑙
𝑖𝑗
be the price of the services provided by
product 𝑗 in period 𝑖, where 𝑗 = 𝑛, 𝑢 refers to, respectively,
new products and used products. Then, the one-period
prices for a new and a used product are given, respectively,
by
𝑙
1𝑛
= 1 − 𝑞
1𝑟(𝑙)
− 𝑞
1𝑚
,
𝑙
2𝑛
= 1 − 𝛾 (𝑞
1𝑟(𝑙)
+ 𝑞
1𝑚
) − 𝑞
2𝑟(𝑙)
− 𝑞
2𝑚
,
𝑙
2𝑢
= 𝛾 (1 − 𝑞
1𝑟(𝑙)
− 𝑞
2𝑟(𝑙)
− 𝑞
1𝑚
− 𝑞
2𝑚
) .
(1)
Because it is “new” when a product is marketed in Period
1 and then is classified as “used” in Period 2, its selling price
in Period 1 is 𝑝
1𝑛
= 𝑙
1𝑛
+ 𝜌𝑙
2𝑢
, where 𝜌 is a discount factor
denoting the cash flows received in Period 2. To simplify,
we assume a zero discount rate and a discount factor 𝜌 =
1 (although allowing the discount factor 0 < 𝜌 < 1
increases the complexity of the analysis, all our results remain
unaffected). Since the product produced in Period 2 provides
only one period of service, there is no distinction between
leasing and selling, and its selling price is 𝑝
2𝑛
= 𝑙
2𝑛
.
4. Model Analysis
In this section, we will outline single-channel models and
dual-channel models and report our main findings.
4.1. Implications of the E-Channel on Selling. To analyze
implications of the e-channel on the strategy of selling, we
first look at model R (see Figure 1(a)) in which no e-channel
is open and all products are sold through an independent
reseller and then consider model RE (see Figure 1(b)) in
which the manufacturer-owned e-channel opens.
4.1.1. Model R. From (1), the inverse demand functions in
model R are as follows:
𝑃
1𝑟
= 𝑙
1𝑛
+ 𝑙
2𝑢
= 1 − 𝑞
1𝑟
+ 𝛾 (1 − 𝑞
1𝑟
− 𝑞
2𝑟
) ,
𝑃
2𝑟
= 𝑙
2𝑛
= 1 − 𝛾𝑞
1𝑟
− 𝑞
2𝑟
.
(2)
We use backward induction to determine the subgame
perfect equilibrium. Specifically, the reseller maximized 𝜋R
2
=
(𝑝
2𝑟
− 𝑤
2𝑟
)𝑞
2𝑟
(we use lowercase 𝜋k
𝑖
and uppercase Πk
𝑖
to
represent the reseller’s (leaser’s) and manufacturer’s profit in
period 𝑖undermodel k) in Period 2 by choosing 𝑞R∗
2𝑟
.Working
backwards, plugging 𝑞R∗
2𝑟
into ΠR
2
= 𝑤
2𝑟
𝑞
2𝑟
and solving the
first-order condition yield 𝑤R∗
2𝑟
.
Given the optimal solution for Period 2, we look at the
decisions in Period 1. The reseller’s problem is to maximize
the total two-period profit, that is, 𝜋R = 𝜋R
1
+ 𝜋
R∗
2
= (𝑝
1𝑟
−
𝑤
1𝑟
)𝑞
1𝑟
+ 𝜋
R∗
2
, by choosing 𝑞R∗
1𝑟
, and then the manufacturer
maximizes the total two-period profit, ΠR = ΠR
1
+ Π
R∗
2
=
𝑤
1𝑟
𝑞
1𝑟
+ Π
R∗
2
, by choosing 𝑤R∗
1𝑟
. We summarize both players’
optimal decisions in Lemma A.1 in Appendix A. All proofs
are provided in Appendix B.
4.1.2. Model RE. From (1), the purchase prices in Period 1 and
Period 2 are
𝑃
1𝑟
= 𝑙
1𝑛
+ 𝑙
2𝑢
= 1 − 𝑞
1𝑟
− 𝑞
1𝑚
+ 𝛾 (1 − 𝑞
1𝑟
− 𝑞
2𝑟
− 𝑞
1𝑚
− 𝑞
2𝑚
) ,
𝑃
2𝑟
= 𝑙
2𝑛
= 1 − 𝛾 (𝑞
1𝑟
+ 𝑞
1𝑚
) − 𝑞
2𝑟
− 𝑞
2𝑚
.
(3)
In model RE, the manufacturer can sell products through
an e-channel; therefore, the manufacturer’s problem is
max
𝑞
2𝑚
Π
RE
2
= 𝑤
2𝑟
𝑞
2𝑟
+ 𝑝
2𝑟
𝑞
2𝑚
− 𝑐𝑞
2𝑚
. Given the man-
ufacturer’s optimal quantities 𝑞RE∗
2𝑚
, the reseller’s problem
is max
𝑞
2𝑟
𝜋
RE
2
= 𝑝
2𝑟
𝑞
2𝑟
− 𝑤
2𝑟
𝑞
2𝑟
. Observing the reseller’s
response 𝑞RE∗
2𝑟
, the manufacturer maximizes his profit (ΠRE
2
)
by choosing 𝑤RE
2𝑟
.
In Period 1, each player’s objective is to maximize the
profit from both periods; that is,
max
𝑞
1𝑚
, 𝑤
1𝑟
Π
RE
= 𝑤
1𝑟
𝑞
1𝑟
+ 𝑝
1𝑟
𝑞
1𝑚
− 𝑐𝑞
1𝑚
+ Π
RE∗
2
,
max
𝑞
1𝑟
𝜋
RE
= 𝑝
1𝑟
𝑞
1𝑟
− 𝑤
1𝑟
𝑞
1𝑟
+ 𝜋
RE∗
2
.
(4)
Working backwards, we derive the optimal strategies of
model RE in Lemma A.2 in Appendix A.
Arya et al.’s [16] outcome is identical to our result of
model RE for the fully deteriorated product; that is, 𝛾 = 0.
Said differently, when product durability 𝛾 = 0, the results
in Lemma A.2 are consistent with that in Arya et al. [16];
therefore, our model nests theirs as a special case.
Based on Lemma A.2, we find several interesting char-
acteristics about channel members’ optimal strategies (see
Figure 2).
Proposition 1. (a) In model RE, the manufacturer opens the
e-channel if and only if 𝑐 < 𝑐
1
(𝛾).
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Figure 1: Model R and model RE.
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Figure 2: Optimal strategies under model RE.
(b) Inmodel RE, when 𝑐 = 0, confronting the manufacturer
encroachment, the reseller starts withdrawing from the market.
From Proposition 1, we find that when the direct selling
disadvantage is not significant, the manufacturer encroaches
into the reseller’smarket.This observation is partly consistent
with that of Arya et al. [16] who conclude that “the manufac-
turer will encroach, if and only if its retail cost disadvantage is
not too pronounced” (P. 654). However, we further find that
durability plays an important role as well; for example, with
product durability increases, the threshold 𝑐
1
(𝛾) decreases
(see Figure 2).
4.1.3. Model R versus Model RE. The following proposition
summarizes the e-channel’s effects on equilibrium outcomes.
Proposition 2. (a)The equilibrium quantities inmodel RE are
always higher than in model R; that is, 𝑞𝑅𝐸
2𝑟
+ 𝑞
𝑅𝐸
2𝑚
> 𝑞
𝑅
2𝑟
and
𝑞
𝑅𝐸
1𝑟
+ 𝑞
𝑅𝐸
1𝑚
> 𝑞
𝑅
1𝑟
.
(b) In Period 2, the wholesale price in model RE is always
lower than inmodel R; that is,𝑤𝑅𝐸
2𝑟
< 𝑤
𝑅
2𝑟
; meanwhile in Period
1, when 𝑐 < 𝑐
2
(𝛾), the manufacturer sets a higher wholesale
price in model RE than that in model R (i.e., 𝑤𝑅𝐸
1𝑟
> 𝑤
𝑅
1𝑟
) but a
lower wholesale price than model R otherwise.
Proposition 2 shows that when the direct selling dis-
advantage 𝑐 is below 𝑐
2
(𝛾), the manufacturer sets a higher
wholesale price in Period 1 under model RE. This can be
interpreted as follows: 𝑐 < 𝑐
2
(𝛾)means that the direct selling
disadvantage is insignificant and the competition between
the reseller channel and manufacturer-owned e-channel is
intense, which results in the fact that the manufacturer
sets a higher wholesale price to reduce the competition
from the reseller. Another interesting characteristic of the
above proposition is that the manufacturer may set a lower
wholesale price in model RE, an observation supported by
Xiong et al. [17] and Arya et al. [16]. For example, Arya et
al. [16] conclude that “if this competitive advantage were not
counterbalanced by a lower wholesale price, the advantage
would reduce the output of the incumbent retailer unduly and
thereby reduce its demand for the essential input” (P. 654).
We now look at the difference in the profits under model
R and model RE and our analysis suggests the following
proposition (see Figure 3).
Proposition 3. (a) The manufacturer is always better off in
model RE than in model R; that is, Π𝑅𝐸 > Π𝑅.
(b) When 𝑐 > 𝑐
3
(𝛾), the reseller’s profit in model RE is
higher than in model R; that is, 𝜋𝑅𝐸 > 𝜋𝑅; otherwise, the
opposite is true.
(c) When 𝑐
4
(𝛾) < 𝑐 < 𝑐
1
(𝛾) or 0 < 𝑐 < 𝑐
5
(𝛾), the supply
chain profit in model RE is higher than that in model R; that is,
Π
𝑅𝐸
𝑇
> Π
𝑅
𝑇
; otherwise, the opposite is true.
Proposition 3 shows that when 𝑐 > 𝑐
3
(𝛾), the direct
selling disadvantage is pronounced; the competition from
the manufacturer encroachment can be overcome by the
reduction in the wholesale prices. As a result, the reseller can
6 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
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Figure 3: 𝜋RE − 𝜋R and ΠRE
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− Π
R
𝑇
.
benefit from the manufacturer encroachment. Proposition 3
also shows that either when the direct selling disadvantage is
sufficiently pronounced (i.e., 𝑐
4
(𝛾) < 𝑐 < 𝑐
1
(𝛾)) or when it is
insignificant (i.e., 0 < 𝑐 < 𝑐
5
(𝛾)), the manufacturer’s direct
selling increases the supply chain profit.The intuition behind
this is that when 0 < 𝑐 < 𝑐
5
(𝛾), the direct selling disadvantage
is so insignificant that the competition from the reseller is
limited. As a result, the manufacturer’s profit increasing is
substantial, which overcomes the loss of the reseller’s profit.
Said differently, the direct selling can enhance supply chain
profit even when it reduces the reseller’s profit. On the other
hand, when 𝑐
4
(𝛾) < 𝑐 < 𝑐
1
(𝛾), the manufacturer’s direct
selling can secure Pareto gains: the manufacturer obtains
more profit by direct selling and the reseller benefits from the
wholesale price decreasing.
We note that Arya et al. [16] also conclude that “when
the retailer’s cost advantage is sufficiently pronounced, the
retailer benefits from encroachment.” And “encroachment
will increase the supply chain profit either when the retailer’s
downstream cost advantage is sufficiently pronounced or
when it is sufficiently limited” (P. 654). We further find, how-
ever, that durability plays an important role; for example (see
Figure 3), with product durability increases, the thresholds of
𝑐
3
(𝛾) and 𝑐
4
(𝛾) increase, but 𝑐
5
(𝛾) decreases.
4.2. Implications of the E-Channel on Leasing. To analyze
implications of the e-channel on the strategy of leasing, we
first look at model L (see Figure 4(a)), in which no e-channel
is open and all products are leased through an independent
leaser, and then considermodel LE (see Figure 4(b)), inwhich
the manufacturer-owned e-channel opens.
4.2.1. Model L. From (1), the inverse demand functions in
model L are as follows:
𝑙
1𝑛
= 1 − 𝑞
1𝑙
,
𝑙
2𝑛
= 1 − 𝛾𝑞
1𝑙
− 𝑞
2𝑙
,
𝑙
2𝑢
= 𝛾 (1 − 𝑞
1𝑙
− 𝑞
2𝑙
) .
(5)
In Period 2, the leaser’s problem is to choose optimal
quantities (𝑞L∗
2𝑙
) to maximize his profits; 𝜋L
2
= (𝑙
2𝑛
− 𝑤
2𝑙
)𝑞
2𝑙
+
𝑙
2𝑢
𝑞
1𝑙
. Given optimal 𝑞L∗
2𝑙
, the manufacturer optimizes profits
by choosing 𝑤L∗
2𝑙
, that is, by maximizing ΠL
2
= 𝑤
2𝑙
𝑞
2𝑙
.
In Period 1, the leaser’s problem is to maximize the total
two-period profit, that is, 𝜋L = 𝜋L
1
+𝜋
L∗
2
= (𝑙
1𝑛
−𝑤
1𝑙
)𝑞
1𝑙
+𝜋
L∗
2
,
by choosing 𝑞L∗
1𝑙
, and then the manufacturer maximizes the
total two-period profits, ΠL = ΠL
1
+ Π
L∗
2
= 𝑤
1𝑙
𝑞
1𝑙
+ Π
L∗
2
,
by choosing 𝑤L∗
1𝑙
. Using backward induction again, we get
Lemma A.3 in Appendix A.
4.2.2. Model LE. We now analyze model LE, in which the
manufacturer sells the products through both a manufac-
turer-owned e-channel and an independent leaser who then
leases the products to consumers.
From (1), the purchase prices in Period 1 and Period 2 are
𝑙
1𝑛
= 1 − 𝑞
1𝑙
− 𝑞
1𝑚
,
𝑙
2𝑛
= 1 − 𝛾 (𝑞
1𝑙
+ 𝑞
1𝑚
) − 𝑞
2𝑙
− 𝑞
2𝑚
,
𝑙
2𝑢
= 𝛾 (1 − 𝑞
1𝑙
− 𝑞
2𝑙
− 𝑞
1𝑚
− 𝑞
2𝑚
) ,
𝑃
1𝑟
= 𝑙
1𝑛
+ 𝑙
2𝑢
= 1 − 𝑞
1𝑙
− 𝑞
1𝑚
+ 𝛾 (1 − 𝑞
1𝑙
− 𝑞
2𝑙
− 𝑞
1𝑚
− 𝑞
2𝑚
) ,
𝑃
2𝑟
= 𝑙
2𝑛
= 1 − 𝛾 (𝑞
1𝑙
+ 𝑞
1𝑚
) − 𝑞
2𝑙
− 𝑞
2𝑚
.
(6)
Inmodel LE, themanufacturer’s problems in Period 2 and
Period 1, respectively, are
max
𝑞
2𝑚
, 𝑤
2𝑙
Π
LE
2
= 𝑤
2𝑙
𝑞
2𝑙
+ 𝑝
2𝑟
𝑞
2𝑚
− 𝑐𝑞
2𝑚
,
max
𝑞
1𝑚
, 𝑤
1𝑙
Π
LE
= 𝑤
1𝑙
𝑞
1𝑙
+ 𝑝
1𝑟
𝑞
1𝑚
− 𝑐𝑞
1𝑚
+ Π
LE∗
2
.
(7)
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Figure 4: Model L and model LE.
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Figure 5: Optimal strategies under model LE.
The leaser’s problems are
max
𝑞
2𝑙
𝜋
LE
2
= 𝑙
2𝑛
𝑞
2𝑙
+ 𝑙
2𝑢
𝑞
1𝑙
− 𝑤
2𝑙
𝑞
2𝑙
,
max
𝑞
1𝑙
𝜋
LE
= 𝑙
1𝑛
𝑞
1𝑙
− 𝑤
1𝑙
𝑞
1𝑙
+ 𝜋
LE∗
2
.
(8)
Using backward induction, we derive the optimal strate-
gies of model LE in Lemma A.4 in Appendix A.
Based on Lemma A.4, we have the following proposition
(see Figure 5).
Proposition 4. (a) In model LE, the manufacturer opens the
e-channel if and only if 𝑐 < 𝑐
6
(𝛾).
(b) In model LE, when 𝑐 ≤ 𝑐
7
(𝛾), confronting the
manufacturer encroachment, the leaser starts withdrawing
from the market in Period 2.
Similar to Proposition 1, we find that when the direct
selling disadvantage is not significant, the manufacturer
encroaches into the leaser’s market. However, we further
find that, in model LE, with product durability increases,
the threshold at which the leaser starts withdrawing from
the market increases. Meanwhile in model RE, similar to
that of Arya et al. [16], the threshold for the reseller starting
withdrawing from the market is 𝑐 = 0. Figure 5 illustrates
these results.
4.2.3. Model L versus Model LE. As before, we look first at the
effects of the e-channel on equilibrium outcomes under both
models.
Proposition 5. (a)The equilibrium quantities in model LE are
always higher than in model L; that is, 𝑞𝐿𝐸
2𝑙
+ 𝑞
𝐿𝐸
2𝑚
> 𝑞
𝐿
2𝑙
and
𝑞
𝐿𝐸
1𝑙
+ 𝑞
𝐿𝐸
1𝑚
> 𝑞
𝐿
1𝑙
.
(b) In Period 1, the wholesale price in model LE is always
lower than in model L; that is,𝑤𝐿𝐸
1𝑙
< 𝑤
𝐿
1𝑙
; meanwhile in Period
2, when 𝑐 < 𝑐
8
(𝛾), the manufacturer sets a higher wholesale
price in model LE but a lower wholesale price than in model L
otherwise.
Proposition 5 shows that, in contrast to model RE, in
which the manufacturer may set a higher wholesale price in
Period 1, the manufacturer here always sets a lower wholesale
price in Period 1, while she may provide a higher wholesale
price in Period 2.The reason for this reversal is that, in Period
2, for the manufacturer, the impacts from the strategies of
leasing and selling are identical, because Period 2 is the last
period of themarket and all newproducts provide one-period
use. Note that, in Period 1, the wholesale price in model LE
is lower than in model L (i.e., 𝑤LE
1𝑙
< 𝑤
L
1𝑙
). To “compensate”
for the profit “loss” in Period 1 and to reduce the competition
from the leaser, the manufacturer sets a higher wholesale
price in Period 2.
We now look at the difference in profits under model L
and model LE (see Figure 6).
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Proposition 6. (a) The manufacturer is always better off in
model LE than in model L; that is, Π𝐿𝐸 > Π𝐿.
(b)When 𝑐 > 𝑐
9
(𝛾), the reseller’s profit inmodel LE is higher
than in model L; that is, 𝜋𝐿𝐸 > 𝜋𝐿; otherwise, the opposite is
true.
(c) When 𝑐
10
(𝛾) < 𝑐 < 𝑐
6
(𝛾) or 0 < 𝑐 < 𝑐
11
(𝛾), the
supply chain profit in model LE is higher than that in model
L; otherwise, the opposite is true.
Obviously, similar to Proposition 3, the above proposi-
tion shows that, under certain conditions, the manufacturer
encroachment may achieve Pareto gains.
4.3. Comparing Implications on Selling and Leasing. In this
section, we provide insights into different implications of the
e-channel on marketing strategies of selling and leasing.
Based on Lemmas A.2 and A.4, we first compare all
parties’ performances under model RE and model LE (see
Figure 7).
Proposition 7. (a) If 𝑐 < 𝑐
12
(𝛾), the leaser has a higher profit
than the reseller; that is, 𝜋𝐿𝐸 > 𝜋𝑅𝐸; otherwise, the opposite is
true.
(b) If 𝑐 < 𝑐
12
(𝛾), the manufacturer is better off in model LE;
that is, Π𝐿𝐸 > Π𝑅𝐸; otherwise, the opposite is true.
Before explaining Proposition 7, we must briefly analyze
the manufacturer’s profit, in dual-channel models, which
comes from two sources: wholesaling products to the reseller
(leaser) and selling through her own e-channel. And recalling
that because of retaining ownership of the products to
mitigate the cannibalization problem between used and new
Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 9
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Figure 8: Variations in the profits.
goods the leaser is more likely to provide a smaller quantity
of units than the reseller.
Proposition 7 can thus be interpreted as follows: anticipat-
ing that the leaser provides a smaller quantity of units than the
reseller, themanufacturer sets a higher wholesale price for the
reseller than that for the leaser. She does so for two reasons.
First, anticipating that the leaser is more likely to provide a
smaller quantity of units than the reseller (which means that
themanufacturer’s potentialmarket is larger and themarginal
revenues in the retail channel are higher) the manufacturer
sets a lower wholesale price to show “appreciation” for the
leaser’s “coordination” and to avoid reducing the leaser’s profit
unduly. Second, because the reseller sells a higher quantity
of units, in order to reduce the competition from the reseller
and to have a larger potential market, the manufacturer sets a
higher wholesale price to him. As a result, compared with the
reseller’s selling, the leaser’s leasing achieves a win-win result:
themanufacturer obtainsmore profit by direct selling and the
leaser benefits from the wholesale price decreasing.
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, “in a competition
situation, selling turns out to be the unique dominant strategy
of the firms” (see Ausubel and Deneckere [48], Von der
Fehr and Ku¨hn [49], Biehl [50], and Poddar [29] for related
results), Proposition 7 implies that under certain conditions,
bearing the brunt of the e-channel, leasing dominates selling.
We believe this difference stems from our focus on the
competition between the upstream manufacturer and the
downstream dealer rather than the competition between two
manufacturers. On the other hand, our observation differs
from those of Bucovetsky and Chilton [51] and Xiong et
al. [17] who argued that “in presence of threat of entry, an
optimal pre-entry contract is a mix of renting and selling,”
a difference that we do not allow; the dealer chooses both
renting and selling together.
We are now in a position to address the question posed
at the beginning of this paper: how does the addition of
an e-channel affect manufacturer’s and reseller’s (leaser’s)
performance? To answer this question, we need to compare
the variations in all parties’ profitability under model R and
model RE with those under model L and model LE. For
simplicity, we use Δ𝜋R(L) = 𝜋RE(LE) − 𝜋R(L) and ΔΠR(L) =
Π
RE(LE)
− Π
R(L) to denote the variations in the reseller’s
(leaser’s) and manufacturer’s profitability under strategies of
selling and leasing, respectively.
Based on Lemmas A.1, A.2, A.3, and A.4, we answer the
above question as follows (see Figure 8).
Proposition 8. (a) When 𝑐
13
(𝛾) < 𝑐 < 𝑐
10
(𝛾), the manu-
facturer’s direct selling adds more pressure on leasing (i.e.,
|Δ𝜋
𝐿
| > |Δ𝜋
𝑅
|); otherwise, the e-channel provides more
pressure on selling; that is, |Δ𝜋𝑅| > |Δ𝜋𝐿|.
(b) When 𝑐 < 𝑐
14
(𝛾), the manufacturer benefits more on
leasing than on selling by adding an e-channel (i.e., |ΔΠ𝐿| >
|ΔΠ
𝑅
|); otherwise, the opposite is true.
The conventional wisdom suggests that, because the
leasers retain ownership of the products for themselves,
which means manufacturer’s direct selling not only impacts
the leasers’ revenue from the new products but also affects
the revenues from the ex-leased units. As a result, the man-
ufacturer’s direct selling adds more pressure on its leasers.
Said differently, the manufacturer-owned e-channel is more
harmful to leasing than to selling.This logic, though, misses a
key point: the manufacturer can alter her preferred wholesale
price.
Proposition 8 shows that (see Figure 8) when 𝑐 < 𝑐
13
(𝛾),
the e-channel provides more pressure on selling and hurts
the reseller more than the leaser. This is because in order
to reduce the competition from the reseller and to have
a larger potential market the manufacturer sets a higher
wholesale price to him. Said differently, the selling achieves
more difficult position to the reseller, because he not only
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needs to compete with the products from e-channel but also
needs to bear higher wholesale prices than leaser.
Proposition 8 also shows that (see Figure 8) when 𝑐 <
𝑐
14
(𝛾), the manufacturer benefits more on leasing than on
selling by adding an e-channel; otherwise, the opposite is
true. The reason behind this is as follows. Indeed when 𝑐 <
𝑐
14
(𝛾), as explanation of Proposition 7 shows, the leaser’s
leasing achieves a win-win result: the manufacturer obtains
more profit by direct selling and the leaser benefits from
the wholesale price decreasing. However, when 𝑐 > 𝑐
14
(𝛾),
most of themanufacturer’s profit drives fromwholesaling; the
manufacturer can benefit from selling compared to leasing,
because the reseller provides more quantity of products to
consumers; that is, |ΔΠ𝑅| > |ΔΠ𝐿|.
5. Conclusion
Organizing and managing channels of distribution is an
important marketing activity for manufacturers. Due to the
emergence of electronic commerce on the Internet, e-channel
distribution systems have been adopted bymanymanufactur-
ers. However, this has not been without many complications
within and across distribution channel systems. Although
the marketing issues associated with leasing and selling have
been well studied in the literature on durable goods, little is
known about how these marketing strategies are impacted
by manufacturers’ adoption of e-channels and a more direct
selling approach to the market. To fill this void, we develop
a two-period model to investigate how the addition of a
manufacturer e-channel impacts on the strategies of selling
and leasing.
Ourmodel extends and generalizesArya et al.’s [16]model
to the durable goods setting. Specifically, we develop two-
period models, in which a manufacturer sells a durable prod-
uct directly through both a manufacturer-owned e-channel
and an independent reseller (leaser) who adopts a strategy
of selling (leasing) to consumers to account for the strategic
effects of product durability, channel structure, and direct
selling cost. Our model thus captures several characteristics
salient in many of today’s durable goods markets.
We find that, direct selling cost aside, product durability
plays an important role in shaping the optimal strategies
of all members. As in Arya et al. [16] and Xiong et al.
[17], our results also show that the addition of an e-channel
may secure Pareto gains, in which all members benefit from
adding an e-channel to the single-channel supply chain.
Among other results, we find that, to reduce the competition
from her intermediaries, the manufacturer may set a higher
wholesale price to the reseller (leaser) in Period 1 (Period 2).
Moreover, contrary to Ausubel and Deneckere [48], Von der
Fehr and Ku¨hn [49], Biehl [50], and Poddar [29], “unlike the
optimum behavior of leasing by a durable goods monopolist,
selling turns out to be the unique dominant strategy of the
competing firms,” we show that, bearing the brunt of the e-
channel, leasing may dominate selling.
We acknowledge the limitations of our model. First, such
assumptions as the monopoly manufacturer, complete infor-
mation, and no service competition could be relaxed. Second,
the reseller (leaser) sells (leases) to consumers at brick-
and-mortar stores, an assumption that although common in
the literature of dual-channel supply chain (e.g., Tsay and
Agrawal [52], Arya et al. [16], Chen et al. [53], and Xiong
et al. [17]) does not reflect the reality that many resellers
have ventured into the online world. Third, we assume that
the e-channel only distributed new products at a normal
price, whereas, in reality, the use of e-channel also serves
the purpose of being a secondary market (Ning et al. [54],
e.g., addressed that a retailer could consider introducing e-
marketplace to dispose of the excess inventory and found
that the expected profit and risk in the supply chain are both
increased when e-marketplace is introduced).
Appendix
A. Four Lemmas
LemmaA.1. In model R, the equilibrium quantities, wholesale
price, and profits, respectively, are
𝑞
𝑅∗
2𝑟
=
15𝛾
2
− 24𝛾 − 32
16 (3𝛾2 − 8𝛾 − 8)
,
𝑤
𝑅∗
2𝑟
=
15𝛾
2
− 24𝛾 − 32
24𝛾2 − 64𝛾 − 64
,
𝑞
𝑅∗
1𝑟
=
3𝛾 + 8
32𝛾 + 32 − 12𝛾2
,
𝑤
𝑅∗
1𝑟
=
45𝛾
3
− 240𝛾 − 128 − 56𝛾
2
32 (3𝛾2 − 8𝛾 − 8)
,
𝜋
𝑅∗
=
99𝛾
4
+ 848𝛾
2
+ 3840𝛾 + 2048 − 864𝛾
3
256 (3𝛾2 − 8𝛾 − 8)
2
,
Π
𝑅∗
=
15𝛾
2
− 112𝛾 − 128
64 (3𝛾2 − 8𝛾 − 8)
.
(A.1)
Lemma A.2. In model RE, the equilibrium quantities, whole-
sale price, and profits, respectively, are
𝑞
𝑅𝐸∗
2𝑚
=
9𝛾
4
− 11𝑐𝛾
4
+ 42𝑐𝛾
3
− 24𝛾
3
+ 6𝑐𝛾
2
− 18𝛾
2
+ 36𝛾 − 76𝑐𝛾 − 40𝑐 + 24
18𝛾4 − 60𝛾3 − 12𝛾2 + 96𝛾 + 48
,
𝑞
𝑅𝐸∗
2𝑟
=
2𝑐
3
,
𝑤
𝑅𝐸∗
2𝑟
=
𝑐𝛾
4
+ 9𝛾
4
− 24𝛾
3
+ 2𝑐𝛾
3
− 2𝑐𝛾
2
− 18𝛾
2
− 12𝑐𝛾 + 36𝛾 + 24 − 8𝑐
18𝛾4 − 60𝛾3 − 12𝛾2 + 96𝛾 + 48
,
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𝑞
𝑅𝐸∗
1𝑚
=
24𝛾
3
+ 40𝑐 + 64𝑐𝛾 + 34𝑐𝛾
4
− 44𝑐𝛾
2
− 52𝑐𝛾
3
− 4𝛾
5
𝑐 − 24 − 48𝛾 − 6𝛾
4
3 (𝛾2 − 2𝛾 − 2)
2
(3𝛾 + 2) (𝛾 − 2)
,
𝑞
𝑅𝐸∗
1𝑟
=
2𝑐 (3𝛾 + 2) (2 − 𝛾)
3 (𝛾2 − 2𝛾 − 2)
2
,
𝑤
𝑅𝐸∗
1𝑟
=
9𝛾
3
+ 8𝑐𝛾 + 4𝑐 − 𝑐𝛾
3
− 2𝑐𝛾 − 24𝛾 − 12
18𝛾2 − 24𝛾 − 24
,
𝜋
𝑅𝐸∗
=
2 (𝛾
4
− 4𝛾
3
− 3𝛾
2
+ 12𝛾 + 8) 𝑐
2
9 (𝛾2 − 2𝛾 − 2)
2
,
Π
𝑅𝐸∗
=
1
36
(27𝛾
6
+ 72𝛾
4
+ 47𝑐
2
𝛾
6
− 54𝑐𝛾
6
− 224𝛾
5
𝑐
2
+ 240𝛾
5
𝑐 − 144𝛾
5
− 84𝑐
2
𝛾
4
− 720𝛾 + 48𝑐𝛾
4
+ 504𝛾
3
− 1008𝑐𝛾
3
+ 1144𝑐
2
𝛾
3
− 24𝑐𝛾
2
− 4𝑐
2
𝛾
2
− 180𝛾
2
− 1488𝑐
2
𝛾 + 1248𝑐𝛾 − 672𝑐
2
− 288 + 576𝑐) (3𝛾
2
− 4𝛾 − 4)
−1
(𝛾
2
− 2𝛾 − 2)
−2
.
(A.2)
LemmaA.3. Inmodel L, the equilibrium quantities, wholesale
price, and profits, respectively, are
𝑞
𝐿∗
2𝑙
=
5𝛾
2
− 4𝛾 − 8
16 (𝛾2 − 2 − 2𝛾)
,
𝑤
𝐿∗
2𝑙
=
5𝛾
2
− 4𝛾 − 8
8 (𝛾2 − 2 − 2𝛾)
,
𝑞
𝐿∗
1𝑙
=
𝛾 + 4
8 (2𝛾 + 2 − 𝛾2)
,
𝑤
𝐿∗
1𝑙
=
11𝛾
3
− 36𝛾 − 8𝛾
2
− 16
16 (𝛾2 − 2𝛾 − 2)
,
𝜋
𝐿∗
=
15𝛾
4
+ 224𝛾 + 128 − 68𝛾
3
+ 20𝛾
2
256 (𝛾2 − 2 − 2𝛾)
2
,
Π
𝐿∗
=
(7𝛾
2
− 24𝛾 − 32)
64 (𝛾2 − 2 − 2𝛾)
.
(A.3)
Lemma A.4. In model LE, the equilibrium quantities, whole-
sale price, and profits, respectively, are
𝑞
𝐿𝐸∗
2𝑚
=
1
6
(1032𝛾
5
− 207𝛾
6
+ 237𝑐𝛾
6
− 1378𝛾
5
𝑐 + 1092𝑐𝛾
4
− 408𝛾
4
+ 4232𝛾
3
𝑐 − 3108𝛾
3
+ 420𝛾
2
− 2252𝛾
2
𝑐 − 5976𝛾𝑐
+ 3240𝛾 + 1296 − 2160𝑐) (3𝛾 + 2)
−1
(2 − 𝛾)
−1
(23𝛾
2
− 54𝛾 − 54)
−1
(𝛾
2
− 2𝛾 − 2)
−1
,
𝑞
𝐿𝐸∗
2𝑙
=
2 (15𝑐𝛾
4
− 62𝛾
3
𝑐 − 3𝛾
3
− 20𝛾
2
𝑐 + 180𝛾𝑐 + 108𝑐)
3 (23𝛾2 − 54𝛾 − 54) (𝛾2 − 2𝛾 − 2)
,
𝑤
𝐿𝐸∗
2𝑙
=
57𝛾
4
𝑐 − 207𝛾
4
− 280𝛾
3
𝑐 + 654𝛾
3
+ 134𝛾
2
𝑐 + 438𝛾
2
− 972𝛾 + 468𝛾𝑐 + 216𝑐 − 648
6 (23𝛾2 − 54𝛾 − 54) (3𝛾 + 2) (2 − 𝛾)
,
𝑞
𝐿𝐸∗
1𝑚
=
2 (102𝛾
5
𝑐 − 583𝛾
4
𝑐 + 90𝛾
4
+ 692𝛾
3
𝑐 − 318𝛾
3
+ 720𝛾
2
𝑐 + 6𝛾
2
+ 648𝛾 − 816𝛾𝑐 + 324 − 540𝑐)
3 (3𝛾 + 2) (2 − 𝛾) (23𝛾2 − 54𝛾 − 54) (𝛾2 − 2𝛾 − 2)
,
𝑞
𝐿𝐸∗
1𝑙
=
2 (8𝛾
3
𝑐 − 38𝛾
2
𝑐 + 3𝛾
2
+ 28𝛾𝑐 + 36𝑐)
(23𝛾2 − 54𝛾 − 54) (𝛾2 − 2𝛾 − 2)
,
𝑤
𝐿𝐸∗
1𝑙
=
1
18
(357𝛾
7
𝑐 + 621𝛾
7
− 2592𝛾
6
− 2250𝛾
6
𝑐 − 1848𝛾
5
+ 3328𝛾
5
𝑐 + 12228𝛾
4
+ 2684𝛾
4
𝑐 + 6804𝛾
3
− 6044𝛾
3
𝑐
− 1944𝛾
2
𝑐 − 15408𝛾
2
− 15552𝛾 + 3168𝛾𝑐 + 1296𝑐 − 3888) (𝛾 − 2)
−1
(3𝛾 + 2)
−1
(23𝛾
2
− 54𝛾 − 54)
−1
(𝛾
2
− 2𝛾 − 2)
−1
,
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𝜋
𝐿𝐸∗
=
2
9
(474816𝛾
4
𝑐
2
− 9360𝛾
7
𝑐 + 306𝛾
7
− 18𝛾
6
− 648𝛾
5
− 324𝛾
4
− 432𝛾
9
𝑐 + 3684𝛾
8
𝑐 + 9560𝛾
8
𝑐
2
+ 76840𝛾
7
𝑐
2
− 186832𝛾
6
𝑐
2
− 130848𝛾
5
𝑐
2
+ 1011𝛾
10
𝑐
2
− 8268𝛾
9
𝑐
2
− 81𝛾
8
+ 255456𝛾
3
𝑐
2
− 422640𝛾
2
𝑐
2
− 399168𝛾𝑐
2
− 93312𝑐
2
+ 768𝛾
6
𝑐 + 21696𝛾
5
𝑐 − 4320𝛾
4
𝑐 − 21600𝛾
3
𝑐 − 7776𝛾
2
𝑐) (3𝛾 + 2)
−1
(𝛾 − 2)
−1
(23𝛾
2
− 54𝛾 − 54)
−2
(𝛾
2
− 2𝛾 − 2)
−2
,
Π
𝐿𝐸∗
=
1
36
(−1242𝛾
6
𝑐 + 621𝛾
6
+ 825𝛾
6
𝑐
2
− 3096𝛾
5
𝑐
2
− 3528𝛾
5
+ 5760𝛾
5
𝑐 + 2124𝛾
4
+ 1392𝛾
4
𝑐 − 6352𝛾
4
𝑐
2
+ 12744𝛾
3
+ 28072𝛾
3
𝑐
2
− 26544𝛾
3
𝑐 − 5436𝛾
2
− 360𝛾
2
𝑐 + 4148𝛾
2
𝑐
2
− 19440𝛾 − 37872𝛾𝑐
2
+ 33696𝛾𝑐 − 7776 + 15552𝑐
− 18144𝑐
2
) (3𝛾 + 2)
−1
(𝛾 − 2)
−1
(23𝛾
2
− 54𝛾 − 54)
−1
(𝛾
2
− 2 − 2𝛾)
−1
.
(A.4)
B. Proofs
Proof of Lemma A.1. Plugging (2) into 𝜋R
2
= (𝑝
2𝑟
− 𝑤
2𝑟
)𝑞
2𝑟
and solving the first-order condition yield
𝑞
R∗
2𝑟
=
1 − 𝛾𝑞
1𝑟
− 𝑤
2𝑟
2
. (B.1)
After substituting (2) and 𝑞R∗
2𝑟
, the problem of the manu-
facturer is given bymax
𝑤
2𝑟
𝑤
2𝑟
((1−𝛾𝑞
1𝑟
−𝑤
2𝑟
)/2); by applying
FOCs to it with respect to 𝑤
2𝑟
, we can obtain 𝑤R∗
2𝑟
= (1 −
𝛾𝑞
1𝑟
)/2.
Plugging (2), 𝑞R∗
2𝑟
, and 𝑤R∗
2𝑟
into 𝜋R
𝑞
1𝑟
= 𝜋
R
1
+ 𝜋
R∗
2
= (𝑝
1𝑟
−
𝑤
1𝑟
)𝑞
1𝑟
+ 𝜋
R∗
2
and solving the first-order condition yield
𝑞
R∗
1𝑟
=
8 − 8𝑤
1𝑟
+ 5𝛾
16𝛾 + 16 − 5𝛾2
. (B.2)
Plugging (2), 𝑞R∗
2𝑟
, 𝑤R∗
2𝑟
, and 𝑞R∗
1𝑟
into ΠR
𝑤
1𝑟
= Π
R
1
+ Π
R∗
2
=
𝑤
1𝑟
𝑞
1𝑟
+ Π
R∗
2
and solving the first-order condition yield
𝑤
R∗
1𝑟
=
45𝛾
3
− 56𝛾
2
− 240𝛾 − 128
32 (3𝛾2 − 8𝛾 − 8)
. (B.3)
Substituting 𝑤R∗
1𝑟
into 𝑞R∗
2𝑟
, 𝑤R∗
2𝑟
, 𝑞R∗
1𝑟
, and the profits of all
members provides the equilibrium outcomes in Lemma A.1.
Proof of Lemma A.2. Plugging (3) intomax
𝑞
2𝑚
Π
RE
2
= 𝑤
2𝑟
𝑞
2𝑟
+
𝑝
2𝑟
𝑞
2𝑚
− 𝑐𝑞
2𝑚
and solving the first-order condition yield
𝑞
RE∗
2𝑚
=
1 − 𝛾𝑞
1𝑟
− 𝛾𝑞
1𝑚
− 𝑞
2𝑟
− 𝑐
2
. (B.4)
Plugging (3) and 𝑞RE∗
2𝑚
into max
𝑞
2𝑟
𝜋
RE
2
= 𝑝
2𝑟
𝑞
2𝑟
− 𝑤
2𝑟
𝑞
2𝑟
and solving the first-order condition yield
𝑞
RE∗
2𝑟
=
1 + 𝑐 − 𝛾𝑞
1𝑟
− 𝛾𝑞
1𝑚
− 𝑤
2𝑙
2
. (B.5)
Plugging (3), 𝑞RE∗
2𝑚
, and 𝑞RE∗
2𝑟
into max
𝑤
2𝑟
Π
RE
2
= 𝑤
2𝑟
𝑞
2𝑟
+
𝑝
2𝑟
𝑞
2𝑚
− 𝑐𝑞
2𝑚
and solving the first-order condition yield
𝑤
RE∗
2𝑟
=
3 − 𝑐 − 3𝛾𝑞
1𝑟
− 3𝛾𝑞
1𝑚
6
. (B.6)
Plugging (3), 𝑞RE∗
2𝑚
, 𝑞RE∗
2𝑟
, and 𝑤RE∗
2𝑟
into max
𝑞
1𝑚
Π
RE
=
𝑤
1𝑟
𝑞
1𝑟
+ 𝑝
1𝑟
𝑞
1𝑚
− 𝑐𝑞
1𝑚
+ Π
RE∗
2
and solving the first-order
condition yield
𝑞
RE∗
1𝑚
=
2 (3𝛾
2
𝑞
1𝑟
− 3𝛾𝑞
1𝑟
+ 2𝑐𝛾 − 3𝑐 + 3 − 3𝑞
1𝑟
)
3 (4𝛾 + 4 − 3𝛾2)
. (B.7)
Plugging (3), 𝑞RE∗
2𝑚
, 𝑞RE∗
2𝑟
,𝑤RE∗
2𝑟
, and 𝑞RE∗
1𝑚
intomax
𝑞
1𝑟
𝜋
RE
=
𝑝
1𝑟
𝑞
1𝑟
− 𝑤
1𝑟
𝑞
1𝑟
+ 𝜋
RE∗
2
and solving the first-order condition
yield
𝑞
RE∗
1𝑚
=
𝑐𝛾
3
− 24𝑤
1𝑟
𝛾 − 24𝑤
1𝑟
+ 24𝛾 + 8𝑐𝛾 + 12 − 9𝛾
3
+ 12𝑐 − 10𝑐𝛾
2
+ 18𝑤
1𝑟
𝛾
2
6 (4 + 8𝛾 − 4𝛾3 + 𝛾4)
. (B.8)
Plugging (3), 𝑞RE∗
2𝑚
, 𝑞RE∗
2𝑟
, 𝑤RE∗
2𝑟
, 𝑞RE∗
1𝑚
, and 𝑞RE∗
1𝑟
into
max
𝑤
1𝑟
Π
RE
= 𝑤
1𝑟
𝑞
1𝑟
+ 𝑝
1𝑟
𝑞
1𝑚
− 𝑐𝑞
1𝑚
+ Π
RE∗
2
and solving the
first-order condition yield
𝑤
RE∗
1𝑟
=
9𝛾
3
+ 8𝑐𝛾 − 𝑐𝛾
3
− 2𝑐𝛾
2
− 24𝛾 + 4𝑐 − 12
6 (3𝛾2 − 4𝛾 − 4)
. (B.9)
Substituting 𝑤RE∗
1𝑟
into 𝑞RE∗
2𝑚
, 𝑞RE∗
2𝑟
, 𝑤R∗
2𝑟
, 𝑞RE∗
1𝑚
, 𝑞RE∗
1𝑟
, and
the profits of all members provides the equilibrium outcomes
in Lemma A.2.
Proof of Proposition 1. This proof follows from optimal
decisions in Lemma A.2:
(a) We find that when 𝑐 < 3(𝛾2 − 2𝛾 − 2)(3𝛾2 − 2𝛾 −
4)/(11𝛾
4
+ 76𝛾 − 6𝛾
2
− 42𝛾
3
+ 40) = 𝑐
1
(𝛾), the
manufacturer opens the e-channel (𝑞RE∗
2𝑚
> 0).
(b) We find that when 𝑐 > 0, 𝑞RE∗
2𝑟
> 0; otherwise,
𝑞
RE∗
2𝑟
< 0; that is, when 𝑐 < 0, the reseller starts
withdrawing from the market.
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Proof of Proposition 2. This proof follows from the equilib-
rium outcomes in Lemmas A.1 and A.2:
(a) Comparing the equilibriumquantities 𝑞RE
2𝑟
+𝑞
RE
2𝑚
(𝑞
RE
1𝑟
+
𝑞
RE
1𝑚
) with 𝑞R
2𝑟
(𝑞
R
1𝑟
), we find that 𝑞RE
2𝑟
+ 𝑞
RE
2𝑚
> 𝑞
R
2𝑟
(𝑞
RE
1𝑟
+
𝑞
RE
1𝑚
> 𝑞
R
1𝑟
).
(b) Comparing 𝑤RE
2𝑟
(𝑤
RE
1𝑟
) with 𝑤R
2𝑟
(𝑤
R
1𝑟
), we find that
𝑤
RE
2𝑟
< 𝑤
R
2𝑟
, and there exists a critical value,
𝑐
2
(𝛾) =
−6𝛾 (36 + 72𝛾 + 2𝛾
2
− 34𝛾
3
+ 9𝛾
4
)
1206𝛾5 + 1708𝛾2 + 3288𝛾 − 213𝛾6 − 1100𝛾4 − 2752𝛾3 + 1008
; (B.10)
when 𝑐 < 𝑐
2
(𝛾), 𝑤RE
1𝑟
> 𝑤
R
1𝑟
; otherwise, 𝑤RE
1𝑟
< 𝑤
R
1𝑟
.
Proof of Proposition 3. This proof follows from the equilib-
rium outcomes in Lemmas A.1 and A.2:
(a) Comparing the equilibrium quantities ΠRE with ΠR,
we find that ΠRE > ΠR.
(b) Comparing 𝜋RE with 𝜋R, we find that there exists a
critical value,
𝑐
3
(𝛾) = 48√2 ((𝛾
4
− 4𝛾
3
− 3𝛾
2
+ 12𝛾 + 8)
⋅ (−864𝛾
3
+ 848𝛾
2
+ 3840𝛾 + 2048 + 99𝛾
4
))
1/2
⋅ (𝛾
2
− 2 − 2𝛾) (3𝛾
2
− 8𝛾 − 8)
−1
(512𝛾
4
− 2048𝛾
3
− 1536𝛾
2
+ 6144𝛾 + 4096)
−1
;
(B.11)
when 𝑐 > 𝑐
3
(𝛾), 𝜋RE > 𝜋R; otherwise, 𝜋RE < 𝜋R.
(c) ComparingΠRE+𝜋RE withΠR+𝜋R, we find that there
exist two critical values,
𝑐
4
(𝛾) =
1
2
(10368𝛾
6
− 52992𝛾
5
+ 768𝛾
4
+ 236544𝛾
3
− 12288𝛾
2
− 319488𝛾 − 147456
− 48 (29104128𝛾
2
− 32278912𝛾
4
+ 12686336𝛾
3
− 28100032𝛾
5
+ 14435920𝛾
6
+ 2844𝛾
11
− 16605𝛾
12
+ 14069696𝛾
7
− 2348760𝛾
9
− 4696964𝛾
8
+ 13008896𝛾 + 890880𝛾
10
+ 1835008)
1/2
) (𝛾
2
− 2 − 2𝛾) (3𝛾
2
− 8𝛾 − 8)
−1
⋅ (4544𝛾
6
− 22528𝛾
5
− 3840𝛾
4
+ 105984𝛾
3
− 6400𝛾
2
− 136192𝛾 − 59392)
−1
,
𝑐
5
(𝛾) =
1
2
(10368𝛾
6
− 52992𝛾
5
+ 768𝛾
4
+ 236544𝛾
3
− 12288𝛾
2
− 319488𝛾 − 147456
+ 48 (29104128𝛾
2
− 32278912𝛾
4
+ 12686336𝛾
3
− 28100032𝛾
5
+ 14435920𝛾
6
+ 2844𝛾
11
− 16605𝛾
12
+ 14069696𝛾
7
− 2348760𝛾
9
− 4696964𝛾
8
+ 13008896𝛾 + 890880𝛾
10
+ 1835008)
1/2
) (𝛾
2
− 2 − 2𝛾) (3𝛾
2
− 8𝛾 − 8)
−1
⋅ (4544𝛾
6
− 22528𝛾
5
− 3840𝛾
4
+ 105984𝛾
3
− 6400𝛾
2
− 136192𝛾 − 59392)
−1
;
(B.12)
when 𝑐
4
(𝛾) < 𝑐 < 𝑐
1
(𝛾) or 0 < 𝑐 < 𝑐
5
(𝛾), the supply
chain profit 𝜋RE + ΠRE > 𝜋R + ΠR; otherwise, the
opposite is true.
Proof of Lemma A.3. Plugging (5) into 𝜋L
2
= (𝑙
2𝑛
− 𝑤
2𝑙
)𝑞
2𝑙
+
𝑙
2𝑢
𝑞
1𝑙
and solving the first-order condition yield
𝑞
L∗
2𝑙
=
1 − 2𝛾𝑞
1𝑙
− 𝑤
2𝑙
2
. (B.13)
After substituting (5) and 𝑞L∗
2𝑙
, the problem of the manu-
facturer is given bymax
𝑤
2𝑙
𝑤
2𝑙
((1−2𝛾𝑞
1𝑙
−𝑤
2𝑙
)/2); by applying
FOCs to it with respect to 𝑤
2𝑙
, we can obtain
𝑤
L∗
2𝑙
=
1 − 2𝛾𝑞
1𝑙
2
. (B.14)
Plugging (5), 𝑞L∗
2𝑙
, and 𝑤L∗
2𝑙
into 𝜋L
𝑞
1𝑙
= 𝜋
L
1
+ 𝜋
L∗
2
= (𝑙
1𝑛
−
𝑤
1𝑙
)𝑞
1𝑙
+ 𝜋
L∗
2
and solving the first-order condition yield
𝑞
L∗
1𝑙
=
3𝛾 + 4 − 4𝑤
1
2 (4𝛾 + 4 − 𝛾2)
. (B.15)
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Plugging (5), 𝑞L∗
2𝑙
, 𝑤L∗
2𝑙
, and 𝑞L∗
1𝑙
into ΠL
𝑤
1𝑙
= Π
L
1
+ Π
L∗
2
=
𝑤
1𝑙
𝑞
1𝑙
+ Π
L∗
2
and solving the first-order condition yield
𝑤
L∗
1𝑙
=
11𝛾
3
− 36𝛾 − 8𝛾
2
− 16
16 (𝛾2 − 2 − 2𝛾)
. (B.16)
Substituting 𝑤L∗
1𝑙
into 𝑞L∗
2𝑙
, 𝑤L∗
2𝑙
, 𝑞L∗
1𝑙
, and the profits of all
members provides the equilibrium outcomes in Lemma A.3.
Proof of Lemma A.4. Plugging (6) into max
𝑞
2𝑚
Π
LE
2
= 𝑤
2𝑙
𝑞
2𝑙
+
𝑝
2𝑟
𝑞
2𝑚
− 𝑐𝑞
2𝑚
and solving the first-order condition yield
𝑞
LE∗
2𝑚
=
1 − 𝛾𝑞
1𝑙
− 𝛾𝑞
1𝑚
− 𝑞
2𝑙
− 𝑐
2
. (B.17)
Plugging (6) and 𝑞LE∗
2𝑚
into max
𝑞
2𝑟
𝜋
LE
2
= 𝑙
2𝑛
𝑞
2𝑙
+ 𝑙
2𝑢
𝑞
1𝑙
−
𝑤
2𝑙
𝑞
2𝑙
and solving the first-order condition yield
𝑞
LE∗
2𝑙
=
1 + 𝑐 − 𝛾𝑞
1𝑙
− 𝛾𝑞
1𝑚
− 𝑤
2𝑙
2
. (B.18)
Plugging (6), 𝑞LE∗
2𝑚
, and 𝑞LE∗
2𝑙
into max
𝑤
2𝑙
Π
LE
2
= 𝑤
2𝑙
𝑞
2𝑙
+
𝑝
2𝑟
𝑞
2𝑚
− 𝑐𝑞
2𝑚
and solving the first-order condition yield
𝑤
LE∗
2𝑙
=
3 − 𝑐 − 4𝛾𝑞
1𝑙
− 3𝛾𝑞
1𝑚
6
. (B.19)
Plugging (6), 𝑞LE∗
2𝑚
, 𝑞LE∗
2𝑙
, and 𝑤LE∗
2𝑙
into max
𝑞
1𝑚
Π
LE
=
𝑤
1𝑙
𝑞
1𝑙
+ 𝑝
1𝑟
𝑞
1𝑚
− 𝑐𝑞
1𝑚
+ Π
LE∗
2
and solving the first-order
condition yield
𝑞
LE∗
1𝑚
=
7𝛾
2
𝑞
1𝑙
+ 4𝛾𝑐 − 6𝑐 − 6𝑞
1𝑙
+ 6 − 6𝛾𝑞
1𝑙
3 (4𝛾 + 4 − 3𝛾2)
. (B.20)
Plugging (6), 𝑞LE∗
2𝑚
, 𝑞LE∗
2𝑙
, 𝑤LE∗
2𝑙
, and 𝑞LE∗
1𝑚
into max
𝑞
1𝑙
𝜋
LE
=
𝑙
1𝑛
𝑞
1𝑙
−𝑤
1𝑙
𝑞
1𝑙
+𝜋
LE∗
2
and solving the first-order condition yield
𝑞
LE∗
1𝑙
=
36 − 3𝛾
3
𝑐 − 72𝑤
1𝑙
𝛾 + 54𝑤
1𝑙
𝛾
2
− 72𝑤
1𝑙
+ 32𝛾𝑐 − 27𝛾
3
+ 36𝑐 + 72𝛾 − 22𝛾
2
𝑐
2 (9𝛾4 + 36 + 2𝛾2 + 72𝛾 − 34𝛾3)
. (B.21)
Plugging (6), 𝑞LE∗
2𝑚
, 𝑞LE∗
2𝑙
, 𝑤LE∗
2𝑙
, 𝑞LE∗
1𝑚
, and 𝑞LE∗
1𝑙
into
max
𝑤
1𝑙
Π
LE
= 𝑤
1𝑙
𝑞
1𝑙
+ 𝑝
1𝑟
𝑞
1𝑚
− 𝑐𝑞
1𝑚
+ Π
LE∗
2
and solving the
first-order condition yield
𝑤
LE∗
1𝑙
=
1
18
(357𝑐𝛾
7
+ 621𝛾
7
− 2592𝛾
6
− 2250𝑐𝛾
6
− 1848𝛾
5
+ 3328𝛾
5
𝑐 + 12228𝛾
4
+ 2684𝑐𝛾
4
+ 6804𝛾
3
− 6044𝛾
3
𝑐 − 1944𝛾
2
𝑐 − 15408𝛾
2
− 15552𝛾 + 3168𝛾𝑐 + 1296𝑐 − 3888) (69𝛾
6
− 392𝛾
5
+ 332𝛾
4
+ 1016𝛾
3
− 572𝛾
2
− 1296𝛾
− 432)
−1
.
(B.22)
Substituting 𝑤LE∗
1𝑙
into 𝑞LE∗
2𝑚
, 𝑞LE∗
2𝑙
, 𝑤LE∗
2𝑙
, 𝑞LE∗
1𝑚
, 𝑞LE∗
1𝑙
, and
the profits of all members provides the equilibrium outcomes
in Lemma A.4.
Proof of Proposition 4. This proof follows from optimal
decisions in Lemma A.4:
(a) We find that when
𝑐 <
3 (69𝛾
6
+ 136𝛾
4
− 344𝛾
5
+ 1036𝛾
3
− 140𝛾
2
− 1080𝛾 − 432)
237𝛾6 − 1378𝛾5 + 1092𝛾4 + 4232𝛾3 − 2252𝛾2 − 5976𝛾 − 2160
= 𝑐
6
(𝛾) , (B.23)
the manufacturer opens the e-channel (𝑞LE∗
2𝑚
> 0).
(b) We find that there exists a critical value,
𝑐
7
(𝛾) =
3𝛾
3
15𝛾4 − 62𝛾3 − 20𝛾2 + 180𝛾 + 108
; (B.24)
when 𝑐 > 𝑐
7
(𝛾), 𝑞LE∗
2𝑙
> 0; otherwise, 𝑞LE∗
2𝑙
≤ 0; that
is, when 𝑐 < 𝑐
7
(𝛾), the leaser starts withdrawing from
the market in Period 2.
Proof of Proposition 5. This proof follows from the equilib-
rium outcomes in Lemmas A.3 and A.4:
(a) Comparing the equilibrium quantities 𝑞LE
2𝑙
+𝑞
LE
2𝑚
(𝑞
LE
1𝑙
+
𝑞
LE
1𝑚
) with 𝑞L
2𝑙
(𝑞
L
1𝑙
), we find that 𝑞LE
2𝑙
+ 𝑞
LE
2𝑚
> 𝑞
L
2𝑙
(𝑞
LE
1𝑙
+
𝑞
LE
1𝑚
> 𝑞
L
1𝑙
).
(b) Comparing 𝑤LE
2𝑙
(𝑤
LE
1𝑙
) with 𝑤L
2𝑙
(𝑤
L
1𝑙
), we find that
𝑤
LE
1𝑙
< 𝑤
L
1𝑙
; and there exists a critical value,
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𝑐
8
(𝛾) =
3𝛾 (2318𝛾
4
+ 6680𝛾
3
− 5088𝛾
2
− 8928𝛾 − 2592 + 621𝛾
6
− 3126𝛾
5
)
8 (3328𝛾5 − 6044𝛾3 − 1944𝛾2 − 2250𝛾6 + 357𝛾7 + 3168𝛾 + 1296 + 2684𝛾4)
; (B.25)
when 𝑐 < 𝑐
8
(𝛾), 𝑤LE
2𝑙
> 𝑤
L
2𝑙
; otherwise, 𝑤LE
2𝑙
< 𝑤
L
2𝑙
.
Proof of Proposition 6. This proof follows from the equilib-
rium outcomes in Lemmas A.3 and A.4:
(a) Comparing the equilibrium quantities ΠLE with ΠL,
we find that ΠLE > ΠL.
(b) Comparing 𝜋LE with 𝜋L, we find that there exists a
critical value,
𝑐
9
(𝛾) =
1
2
(3981312𝛾
2
− 11108352𝛾
5
− 393216𝛾
6
+ 4792320𝛾
7
− 1886208𝛾
8
+ 221184𝛾
9
+ 2211840𝛾
4
+ 11059200𝛾
3
− 96 (8819462062080𝛾
2
+ 2116748630016𝛾
4
+ 13392227819520𝛾
3
− 18703415808000𝛾
5
− 15671382838272𝛾
6
+ 278628139008
+ 2285906678528𝛾
11
+ 2498220801696𝛾
12
− 15037686912𝛾
17
+ 48133710𝛾
20
− 902043072𝛾
19
+ 6283751376𝛾
18
− 1090461701888𝛾
13
− 37302592776𝛾
16
+ 276600397856𝛾
15
− 316861457856𝛾
14
+ 10684931867136𝛾
7
− 4480236638208𝛾
9
+ 15181519996032𝛾
8
+ 2515392921600𝛾
− 8010597677824𝛾
10
)
1/2
) (243105792𝛾
4
− 95657984𝛾
6
− 66994176𝛾
5
+ 130793472𝛾
3
− 216391680𝛾
2
− 204374016𝛾 − 47775744
+ 39342080𝛾
7
+ 4894720𝛾
8
− 4233216𝛾
9
+ 517632𝛾
10
)
−1
;
(B.26)
when 𝑐 > 𝑐
9
(𝛾), 𝜋LE > 𝜋L; otherwise, 𝜋LE < 𝜋L.
(c) ComparingΠLE+𝜋LE withΠL+𝜋L, we find that there
exist two critical values,
𝑐
10
(𝛾) =
1
2
(−108478464𝛾
5
+ 552480768𝛾
4
+ 281788416𝛾
3
− 467306496𝛾
2
+ 66994176𝛾
7
+ 33564672𝛾
8
− 16206336𝛾
9
+ 1828224𝛾
10
− 107495424 − 447897600𝛾 − 241499136𝛾
6
− 48 (975198486528 + 39312097763328𝛾
2
+ 21201744743424𝛾
4
+ 69051360743424𝛾
3
− 103862582470656𝛾
5
− 117015589324800𝛾
6
+ 4401973467904𝛾
11
+ 26731202768272𝛾
12
+ 163151540580𝛾
16
− 333695359704𝛾
17
+ 548767143𝛾
20
− 11408569848𝛾
19
+ 92958565536𝛾
18
− 5398938263616𝛾
13
+ 2454413485232𝛾
15
− 5569297462912𝛾
14
+ 48833163728640𝛾
7
− 8626694923648𝛾
9
+ 121365459983552𝛾
8
+ 9918387781632𝛾
− 70834170203136𝛾
10
)
1/2
) (805064704𝛾
4
− 309561856𝛾
6
− 244125696𝛾
5
+ 478900224𝛾
3
− 720552960𝛾
2
− 716967936𝛾 − 173187072
+ 131136512𝛾
7
+ 15781376𝛾
8
− 14070528𝛾
9
+ 1732032𝛾
10
)
−1
,
𝑐
11
(𝛾) =
1
2
(−108478464𝛾
5
+ 552480768𝛾
4
+ 281788416𝛾
3
− 467306496𝛾
2
+ 66994176𝛾
7
+ 33564672𝛾
8
− 16206336𝛾
9
+ 1828224𝛾
10
− 107495424 − 447897600𝛾 − 241499136𝛾
6
+ 48 (975198486528 + 39312097763328𝛾
2
+ 21201744743424𝛾
4
+ 69051360743424𝛾
3
− 103862582470656𝛾
5
− 117015589324800𝛾
6
+ 4401973467904𝛾
11
+ 26731202768272𝛾
12
+ 163151540580𝛾
16
− 333695359704𝛾
17
+ 548767143𝛾
20
− 11408569848𝛾
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+ 92958565536𝛾
18
− 5398938263616𝛾
13
+ 2454413485232𝛾
15
− 5569297462912𝛾
14
+ 48833163728640𝛾
7
− 8626694923648𝛾
9
+ 121365459983552𝛾
8
+ 9918387781632𝛾
− 70834170203136𝛾
10
)
1/2
) (805064704𝛾
4
− 309561856𝛾
6
− 244125696𝛾
5
+ 478900224𝛾
3
− 720552960𝛾
2
− 716967936𝛾 − 173187072
+ 131136512𝛾
7
+ 15781376𝛾
8
− 14070528𝛾
9
+ 1732032𝛾
10
)
−1
;
(B.27)
when 𝑐
10
(𝛾) < 𝑐 < 𝑐
6
(𝛾) or 0 < 𝑐 < 𝑐
11
(𝛾), the supply
chain profit 𝜋LE + ΠLE > 𝜋L + ΠL; otherwise, the
opposite is true.
Proof of Proposition 7. This proof follows from optimal
decisions in Lemmas A.2 and A.4.
Comparing 𝜋RE(ΠRE) with 𝜋LE(ΠLE), we find that there
exists a critical value,
𝑐
12
(𝛾) =
𝛾
2
(768𝛾
4
− 9360𝛾
5
− 432𝛾
7
+ 3684𝛾
6
− 21600𝛾 − 7776 + 21696𝛾
3
− 4320𝛾
2
− 6 (1679616 + 19657728𝛾
2
− 22624560𝛾
4
+ 5909760𝛾
3
− 15102144𝛾
5
+ 13818536𝛾
6
+ 8279448𝛾
7
− 1032280𝛾
9
− 6610920𝛾
8
+ 1734738𝛾
10
+ 42849𝛾
12
− 477342𝛾
11
+ 10077696𝛾)
1/2
) (83788𝛾
3
+ 33067𝛾
7
− 39852𝛾
6
− 61760𝛾
5
+ 116824𝛾
4
+ 576𝛾
9
− 7648𝛾
8
− 93888𝛾
2
− 92736𝛾 − 20736)
−1
;
(B.28)
when 𝑐 < 𝑐
12
(𝛾), (a) 𝜋LE > 𝜋RE and (b)ΠLE > ΠRE; otherwise,
𝜋
LE
< 𝜋
RE and ΠLE < ΠRE.
Proof of Proposition 8. This proof follows from optimal
decisions in Lemmas A.1, A.2, A.3, and A.4:
(a) Comparing Δ𝜋R = 𝜋RE −𝜋R with Δ𝜋L = 𝜋LE −𝜋L, we
find that there exists a critical value,
𝑐
13
(𝛾) =
1
2
(73728𝑟
9
− 978944𝑟
8
+ 4232576𝑟
7
− 5101056𝑟
6
− 7905280𝑟
5
+ 14953472𝑟
4
+ 10724864𝑟
3
− 12017664𝑟
2
− 11870208𝑟
− 2654208) (−165888𝑟
10
+ 1857024𝑟
9
− 6924288𝑟
8
+ 6107136𝑟
7
+ 17129472𝑟
6
− 24662016𝑟
5
− 26087424𝑟
4
+ 23556096𝑟
3
+ 30081024𝑟
2
+ 7962624𝑟 + 48 (123834728448
+ 1180729737216𝑟 − 2411259052032𝑟
4
+ 6041802203136𝑟
3
+ 15118687095424𝑟
7
− 11165865072768𝑟
6
− 16775099375616𝑟
5
− 7433595964736𝑟
9
+ 18618855245536𝑟
8
− 14231489629152𝑟
10
− 1813386025720𝑟
14
− 1740206450432𝑟
13
+ 3204102325312𝑟
11
− 165219478380𝑟
17
+ 765951670936𝑟
15
+ 190740007966𝑟
16
+ 22654457950𝑟
18
− 16454016𝑟
22
− 2708248626𝑟
20
+ 6767119788𝑟
19
+ 350581824𝑟
21
)
1/2
) (3𝑟
2
− 8𝑟 − 8)
−1
;
(B.29)
when 𝑐 < 𝑐
13
(𝛾), Δ𝜋R < Δ𝜋L < 0; when 𝑐
13
(𝛾) <
𝑐 < 𝑐
10
(𝛾), 0 > Δ𝜋R > Δ𝜋L; when 𝑐 > 𝑐
10
(𝛾), Δ𝜋R >
Δ𝜋
L
> 0.
(b) Comparing ΔΠR = ΠRE − ΠR with ΔΠL = ΠLE − ΠL,
we find that there exists a critical value,
𝑐
14
(𝛾) =
1
2
(1568768𝑟
4
− 87040𝑟
8
+ 398496𝑟
7
− 512064𝑟
6
− 779328𝑟
5
+ 6144𝑟
9
+ 1116160𝑟
3
− 1318912𝑟
2
− 1306624𝑟 − 294912) (294912𝑟
4
+ 43392𝑟
7
− 4608𝑟
8
− 121344𝑟
6
+ 19968𝑟
5
− 110592𝑟 − 69120𝑟
3
− 307200𝑟
2
− 24 (−79488𝑟
18
+ 1392192𝑟
17
+ 127401984
+ 1050181632𝑟 − 2424792064𝑟
4
+ 3340107776𝑟
3
+ 3166507008𝑟
2
+ 6639512256𝑟
7
− 1081918016𝑟
6
− 7365509120𝑟
5
− 3872791552𝑟
9
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+ 1951836624𝑟
8
− 736945864𝑟
10
+ 102254842𝑟
14
− 326200624𝑟
13
− 77091060𝑟
12
+ 1545973096𝑟
11
+ 5900110𝑟
15
− 7909782𝑟
16
)
1/2
) ;
(B.30)
when 𝑐 < 𝑐
14
(𝛾), ΔΠL > ΔΠR > 0; otherwise, ΔΠR >
ΔΠ
L
> 0.
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